John Mearsheimer

state that is substantially more powerful than the other great powers in the system is not a hegemon, because it faces, by definition, other great powers

In sum, great powers pursue four main goals: 1) to be the only regional hegemon on the globe, 2) to control as large a percentage of the world’s wealth as possible, 3) to dominate the balance of land power in their region, and 4) to have nuclear superiority. Let us now move from goals to strategies, starting with the strategies that states employ to increase their relative power

France sought to conquer territory all across Europe, although it tended to work its way from west to east over time. Its main targets in western Europe were Belgium, which Austria controlled in 1792; the Dutch Republic; the various German political entities opposite France’s eastern border, such as Bavaria, Hanover, and Saxony, which I refer to throughout this chapter as the “Third Germany

When Bismarck stepped down as chancellor in March 1890, Germany was not yet a potential hegemon, although it had a large and growing population, a dynamic economy, and a formidable army. Those combined assets caused much anxiety among Europe’s other great powers in the last decade of the nineteenth century

to the balance of power and will look for opportunities to increase their own power or weaken rivals. In practical terms, this means that states will adopt diplomatic strategies that reflect the opportunities and constraints created by the particular distribution of power. Specifically, the theory predicts that a threatened state is likely to balance promptly and efficiently in bipolarity, because neither buck-passing nor great-power balancing coalitions are feasible when there are only two great powers in the system

Security competition is endemic to daily life in the international system, but war is not. Only occasionally does security competition give way to war

One might surmise that international anarchy is the key structural factor that causes states to fight wars. After all, the best way for states to survive in an anarchic system in which other states have some offensive capability and intentions that might be hostile is to have more rather than less power.

international system is usually arranged in three different ways: bipolarity

balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity

he problem is that anarchy is a constant—the system is always anarchic—whereas war is not. To account for this important variation in state behavior, it is necessary to consider another structural variable: the distribution of power among the leading states in the system. As discussed in Chapter 8, power in the